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The Case for Regulating Nanotechnologies: International, European and 
National Perspectives 
 
Sekai Ngarize, Karen E. Makuch and Ricardo Pereira 
 
Governments in leading industrialized countries are currently primarily relying on 
existing regulatory frameworks for environmental, health and safety regulation to 
cover nanotechnology risks. European and national regulators have generally 
concluded that any risks posed by nanomaterials can be addressed using existing 
frameworks, with minor adjustments to specific regulations. Identifying appropriate 
responses to uncertain risks is a difficult task for policy makers and regulatory 
agencies, as they are faced with a high degree of scientific uncertainty, the need to 
balance the costs and benefits of regulation, and the need to find a reasonable 
compromise between scientific freedom, technological innovation, consumer safety and 
environmental protection. As nanotechnologies are arguably only recently gaining 
public prominence, and their regulation is still in its infancy, this article examines some 
of the issues faced by regulators, offers insights into potential methods for regulation 
and critiques the current state of international, European and national law and policy. 
The article concludes that to address the current regulatory gaps and environmental 
and health safety concerns surrounding nanomaterials, nano-specific regulation 
establishing product-specification, notification, public disclosure and risk assessment 
requirements is necessary. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate concerning the regulation of nanomaterials (NMs)1 has focused on whether 
NMs could harm the environment and human health, much along the lines of the 
biotechnology debate of the 1990s and early 2000s.2 Yet, concerted regulation in this 
area is still lacking. A key issue in the regulation of nanotechnologies is that the 
deliberate exploitation of properties at nanoscale is central to their application and may 
cause NMs to exhibit very different properties from their conventional bulk 
substances. Potential benefits of these technologies include vast product, industrial and 
                                                
1 In the absence of a generally accepted definition, the term ‘nanomaterials’ is used in this article to cover 
commonly used terminology such as manufactured (or engineered) nano-sized and nano-structured 
nanomaterials. 
2  See also L. Boisson de Chazournes and U.P. Thomas (eds.), WTO Law, Science and Risk 
Communication (Special Edition), 3 EcoLomic Policy and Law (2006), found at: 
<http://www.ecolomics-
international.org/epal_2006_special_edition_wto_law_science_and_risk_communication.pdf>; and L. 
Boisson de Chazournes and M.M. Mbengue, ‘GMOs and Trade: Issues at Stake in the EC Biotech 
Dispute’, 13:3 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (2005), 289. 
 technological applications, wealth generation, job creation, and other societal advances.3 
Conversely, risks associated with these technologies include potentially serious risks to 
human health and the environment,4 as NMs may be discharged directly into rivers or 
the atmosphere by industry or escape when products are used or disposed of in the 
environment. However, at this stage, the effects of NMs and their toxicological 
impacts on human health and the environment are not yet fully understood.5 
 
Rapid commercialization of NMs suggests that the potential for human and 
environmental exposure will increase dramatically.6 However, the pace of regulatory 
progress lags behind the speed at which NMs are being introduced in the market.7 
Arguably, regulatory challenges are related to uncertainties regarding the development 
and commercial applications of NMs, hazards and exposure pathways, the speed of 
technological change and effectiveness of existing regulatory frameworks. The lack of 
scientific certainty about the behaviour of some types of nanomaterials in the 
environment or risks they pose for human health is a cause for concern. Indeed, some 
reviews on toxicity are beginning to indicate that NMs are more reactive and toxic 
than their unadulterated counterparts.8 
 
Furthermore, the transboundary movement and trade of nanotechnologies across 
countries and sectors means that a number of existing international institutions and 
instruments will be relevant to the regulation of nanotechnology. A global approach 
to regulation is arguably necessary, in terms of the institutional frameworks, standards 
and policies addressing nano-regulation issues, as well as to address the potential 
transboundary environmental impacts. 
 
The aim of this article is to assess the extent to which nano-specific regulation is 
necessary to address the recognized and perceived threats to health and the 
environment. The article first discusses the precautionary principle as the basis for 
nanotechnology regulation. It then reviews the approaches to the regulation of 
nanotechnologies at the international, European and national levels. The last part of 
the article assesses options for reform of the regulatory regimes currently in force. 
                                                
3 For example, nanomaterials are used to create very fine membranes, which act as effective filters, and 
magnetic nanoparticles remove heavy metal contaminants from waste water. Nanotechnologies have 
also revolutionized manufacturing processes in the consumer sector, creating a new generation of NM 
products such as resistant glass, water repellents and anti-odour, crease-free fabrics. Nanotechnology is a 
multi-billion dollar industry expected to grow to US$ 1 trillion by 2015. See Q. Chaudhry, A. Boxall, R. 
Aitken and M. Hull, A Scoping Study into the Manufacture and Use of Nanomaterials in the UK 
(Central Science Laboratory, 2005). 
4 NMs covering relatively large surface areas are potentially more reactive and toxic compared to their 
conventional bulk substances. See K. Thomas et al., ‘Research Strategies for Safety Evaluation of 
Nanomaterials, Part VIII: International Efforts to Develop Risk-based Safety Evaluations for 
Nanomaterials’, 92:1 Toxicological Sciences (2006), 23. 
5 See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Current Developments 
in Delegations on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials – Tour de Table (OECD, 2013); M. 
Kendall and S. Holgate, ‘Health Impact and Toxicological Effects of Nanomaterials in the Lung’ 17:5 
Respirology (2012), 739. 
6 K. Floroni, S. Walsh, J.M. Balbus and R. Denson, ‘Nanotechnology: Getting it Right the First Time’, 
6:3 Sustainable Development Law and Policy (2006), 46. 
7 Ibid. 
8 S.T. Holgate, ‘Exposure, Uptake, Distribution and Toxicity of Nanomaterials in Humans’, 6:1 
Journal of Biomedical Nanotechnology (2010), 1; A.D. Maynard et al., ‘Safe Handling of 
Nanotechnology’, 444:7117 Nature (2006), 267; Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP), Novel Materials in the Environment: The Case of Nanotechnology (RCEP, 2008). 
  
THE BASIS FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION: THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
The regulation of the nanotechnology industry provides an opportunity for the 
application of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle has been 
incorporated into international, regional and national environmental law and policy 
instruments.9 It is a useful policy- and decision-making tool and has been discussed at 
length in its own right.10 The implication of the adoption of the precautionary principle 
in the regulation of nanomaterials is that NMs would be placed in the highest hazard 
category, unless sufficient evidence or information is available to justify a lower level 
of hazard classification. Another implication of the precautionary principle is that the 
burden of proof of demonstrating risk would normally lie with the promoter of a 
potentially harmful activity, who must prove that there is no risk of harm. Hence, the 
precautionary principle would shift the burden of proof from the regulator to the 
producer.11 
 
According to the precautionary principle, ‘[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.12 It thus 
gives policy makers leeway to move forward and tighten environmental regulatory 
controls despite a lack of scientific consensus regarding the nature and seriousness of 
the ‘perceived’ threat to the environment or human health. However, precautionary 
measures must be based on more than a mere hypothesis or purely theoretical 
assessments. There must be a ‘reasonable ground for concern’.13 
 
In the UK, a 2004 report by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineers14 
recommended that factories and research laboratories treat manufactured nanoparticles 
and nanotubes as if they were hazardous and seek to reduce or remove them from 
waste streams. It further suggested that industry should assess the risk of release of 
                                                
9 See, e.g., Declaration on Environment and Development, found in Report of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992), Annex (‘Rio 
Declaration’), Principle 15; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 
May 1992: in force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’), Article 3.3; and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena, 29 January 2000; in force 11 September 2003) 
(‘Cartagena Protocol’); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
[2008] OJ C115/49 (‘TFEU’), Article 191.2. 
10 See, e.g., N. de Sadeleer (ed.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Approaches from the 
Nordic Countries, EU and USA (Earthscan, 2007); E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. van Schomberg (eds.), 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar, 2006); M. 
Fitzmaurice, Contemporary Issues in International Environmental Law (Edward Elgar, 2009); E. Hey, 
‘The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution’, 4:2 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (1992) 303. 
11 This is the approach taken, for example, under the EU chemical Regulations, discussed below. 
However, a different stance was adopted by the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills case 
(ICJ 20 April 2010, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Joint Dissenting Opinion, 
[2010] ICJ. Rep 14) (‘Pulp Mills’), see in particular paragraph 164). 
12 Rio Declaration, n. 9 above; see also UNFCCC, n. 9 above, Article 3.3 (omitting the reference to 
cost-effectiveness). 
13 Commission of the European Community Communication of 2 February 2000 on the Precautionary 
Principle, COM (2000)1, at 2 and 8. 
14 Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: 
Opportunities and Uncertainties (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering, 2004). 
 NMs from products or processes throughout their life cycle. The ‘innovation’ versus 
‘precaution’ debate has evolved from the question of whether the benefits of 
nanotechnology are worth the risk taken and ventures into the realm of the debate 
over the (un)certainty of the risk. It is suggested that in the light of scientific 
uncertainty and considering the costs of (in)action, law and policy makers must apply 
the principle of precaution. Considering the magnitude of the risks, to ‘err on the safe 
side’ is a better policy option than to face the consequences. 
 
This debate resembles that regarding the authorization of release of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), in which two major global markets players –the United 
States and the European Union – have taken opposing views on the legal implications 
of the precautionary ‘principle’ or ‘approach’.15 Despite these opposing views, the 
precautionary principle is gradually evolving into the corpus of customary international 
law, as has recently been opined by the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.16 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: 
INSTITUTIONS, STANDARDS AND TRADE 
 
The transboundary nature of nanotechnologies suggests that a number of international 
institutions and instruments are relevant to the regulation of nanotechnology. 
Therefore, a global approach to regulation may be necessary for regulating 
nanotechnologies and their environmental impacts. This suggestion is reinforced by the 
fact that economic globalization and the creation of international institutions have been 
powerful driving forces behind the growth of globally harmonized standards in areas 
including technical product specification and consumer, health and environmental 
protection.17 
 
Presently, nanotechnology is not specifically subject to any single international 
regulatory instrument and many nanoproducts fall within pre-existing international and 
national regulations.18 Yet the development of harmonized international standards is 
essential in facilitating trade across many jurisdictions and for regulating NMs. The 
absence of a consensus on definitions, common nomenclature and standards for 
                                                
15 The US insists on using the term precautionary ‘approach’ in the belief that it is less expansive than 
the term ‘principle’, hence giving it less legal weight. While the EU system of GMO authorization 
places more emphasis on the precautionary approach, the US places greater emphasis on sound science 
and risk assessment. On the transatlantic trade disputes applying and interpreting the precautionary 
principle, see in particular: WTO AB 16 January 1998, European Communities – Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R (EC-Hormones); WTO DS 21 November 2006, 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R. 
16 The Seabed Disputes Chamber of International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) opined that 
the precautionary approach may have reached the status of customary law. See ITLOS 1 February 2011, 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), found at: 
<http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf>, particularly 
paragraphs 131 and 135. This is the first time that there is a clear statement from an international 
tribunal regarding the legal status of the precautionary principle. Compare it with ICJ 20 December 
1974, Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1974] ICJ Rep. 253; EC-Hormones, n. 15 above; and 
EC-Biotech, n. 15 above. 
17 D. Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States’, 3 Yearbook of 
European Environmental Law (2003), 1. 
18 See D.M. Bowman and G.A. Hodge,‘A Small Matter of Regulation – An International Review of 
Nanotechnology Regulation’, 8 The Columbia Science and Technology Law and Review (2007), 1. 
 classification and testing of nanotechnology and NMs makes it very difficult to define 
or classify the objects or processes to be regulated. 
 
A number of international soft law standards on NMs have been adopted, including 
codes of conduct and risk management standards.19 They have been adopted by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO),20 the Strategic Approach to 
International Chemicals Management (SAICM) (which considers nanotechnologies as 
an emerging issue),21 and the ISO Technical Committee 229 in conjunction with 
International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Committee 113.22 The work on 
standards represents an important first stage in national and international regulatory 
development processes. 23  Although they are non-binding, these initiatives are 
important in building a firm knowledge base to support policy decisions and may 
become an essential prerequisite to appropriate regulation. 
 
One of the main fora through which States have sought to create common approaches 
on scientific building blocks for nanotechnology to date is the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD’s work on 
nanotechnology has been driven by the network of multidisciplinary experts within 
the Chemicals Committee, and has led to the establishment of a Working Party on 
Manufactured Nanomaterials24 to promote international cooperation in health- and 
environmental safety-related aspects of manufactured NMs. Guidelines of the 
Committee are not binding on member countries but could form the basis for an 
emerging consensus on a global regulatory framework. The OECD’s focus has been 
on information gathering and sharing with a view to addressing technical issues of 
scientific building blocks, including risk assessment and management, as well as 
broader political questions concerning the member countries. 
 
Aside from these soft law instruments, international treaties play a significant role in 
regulating aspects of NMs. The main international treaties regulating the trade in 
chemicals are the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
                                                
19  Commission Recommendation of 7 February 2008 on a Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research, C(2008) 424 final. 
20 The ISO established the 229 Nanotechnologies Technical Committee in 2005, with the aim to develop 
international standards for nanotechnologies. See 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=381983>. See also D.M. Bowman and 
G.A. Hodge, n. 18 above. 
21 The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) is a non-binding policy 
framework to promote chemical safety around the world. It was adopted by the International 
Conference on Chemicals Management in Dubai in February 2006. The SAICM has as its overall 
objective the achievement of the sound management of chemicals throughout their life cycle so that, by 
2020, chemicals are produced and used in ways that minimize significant adverse impacts on human 
health and the environment. This ‘2020 goal’ was adopted by the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002 as part of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. See 
<http://www.saicm.org>. 
22 This committee develops nanotechnology standards at the international level. Standard development in 
the committee took off quite rapidly in 2009-2010, particularly focusing on terminology, nomenclature, 
measurement, and characterization of NM. See 
<http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_technical_committee?commid=381983>. 
23 See D.M. Bowman and G.A. Hodge, n. 18 above. 
24 OECD, Current Developments/Activities on the Safety of Manufactured Nanomaterials: Tour de Table 
at the 1st Meeting of the Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (OECD, 2006), The OECD 
Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials gathers data and information on characterization and 
safety of NMs in liaison with the ISO Technical Committee 229. 
 (POPs)25 and the 1998 Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (PIC) for 
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade.26 Despite the fact 
that nanotechnologies are not expressly mentioned in either treaty, or listed in their 
annexes, the conventions do not use particle size to define their scope or obligations. 
Hence, they do regulate the trade in NMs that meet the chemical composition and 
product characteristics regulated in those conventions.27 Moreover, they could be used 
to address issues linked to the release of NMs into the environment. 
 
The Stockholm Convention entered into force in May 2004, and at the time of writing 
has 179 ratifications.28 Although the Convention has been successful in attracting a 
high number of ratifications, the United States – a major producer of 
nanotechnologies29 – has not ratified it. The objective of the Stockholm Convention is 
to protect human health and the environment from POPs using a precautionary 
approach.30 Like other international environmental agreements that restrict trade, the 
Convention works with a number of annexes. Trade in chemical substances listed in 
Annexes A, B and C are respectively prohibited, restricted or regulated, depending on 
their toxicity levels.31 However, the Stockholm Convention lacks the mechanisms of 
advanced informed consent32 and risk assessment procedures,33 which are at the heart 
of the safeguards present in other trade-restrictive environmental treaties, such as the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which regulates the trade in GMOs, or the 
Rotterdam Convention (discussed below). Moreover, unlike the Cartagena Protocol, 
no permanent compliance committee or international civil liability regime for 
environmental damage have been formally adopted by the parties. 
 
The international legal framework for the trade in dangerous chemicals is 
                                                
25 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm, 22 May 2001; in force 17 May 
2004) (‘Stockholm Convention’). POPs are organic (carbon-based) chemical substances. They possess 
a particular combination of physical and chemical properties such that, once released into the 
environment, they remain intact for exceptionally long periods of time. On nanotechnology and POPs, 
see: O. Kharlamov, G. Kharlamova, N. Kirillova and V. Fomenko, ‘Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(Pops) at Nanotechnology and Their Impact on People Health’, in: E. Mehmetli and B. Koumanova 
(eds.), The Fate of Organic Pollutants in the Environment (Springer, 2008), 425. 
26 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam, 10 September 1998; in force 24 February 2004) 
(‘Rotterdam Convention’). For a more detailed analysis of the Rotterdam Convention, see, e.g., P. 
Barrios, ‘The Rotterdam Convention of Hazardous Chemicals: A Meaningful Step toward 
Environmental Protection’, 16:4 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review (2003), 679. 
27 A. Petitpierre-Sauvain (ed.), The Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions on Chemicals and 
Wastes – Regulation, Sound Management and Governance (Special Edition), 5-7 EcoLomic Policy and 
Law (2008-2010). found at: <http://www.ecolomics-
international.org/epal_2008_2010_special_edition_ruig_geneva_based_chemicals_and_wastes_conven
tions.pdf>. 
28  Status of ratifications, found at: 
<http://chm.pops.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/tabid/252/Default.aspx>. 
29 At 49%, the United States currently has the largest share of the nanotechnology market, followed by 
the European Union (30%), and the rest of the world (21%). Within the European Union, the United 
Kingdom is said to account for close to one third of the European nanotechnology market share. See 
also Q. Chaudhry et al., n. 3 above. 
30 Stockholm Convention, n. 25 above, Article 1. 
31 Parties must take measures to eliminate the production and use of the chemicals listed under Annex 
A, and must take measures to restrict the production and use of the chemicals listed under Annex B. 
Parties must also take measures to reduce the unintentional releases of chemicals listed under Annex C. 
32 Cartagena Protocol, n. 9 above, Articles 8-10 and 12. 
33 Ibid., Article 15. 
 complemented by the Rotterdam Convention. The aim of the Rotterdam Convention is 
to promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among parties in the 
international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health 
and the environment from potential harm; and to contribute to the environmentally 
sound use of certain hazardous chemicals by facilitating information exchange about 
their characteristics and providing for a national decision making process on their 
import and export.34 At the heart of the Rotterdam Convention is a voluntary advanced 
informed procedure that needs to precede the trade in dangerous chemical substances 
listed in Annex III.35 Decisions by the Conference of the Parties may add further 
chemicals to Annex III; hence the regulatory regime may evolve in light of new 
scientific evidence. Once a chemical is included in Annex III, a ‘decision guidance 
document’, containing information concerning the chemical and the regulatory 
decisions to ban or severely restrict the chemical for health or environmental reasons, 
is circulated to all parties.36 The Convention also contains further provisions on 
information exchange, requiring parties to prepare a response concerning the future 
import of a chemical within nine months.37 
 
In addition to these environmental treaties, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT),38 adopted under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), is the 
key international institution concerned with the liberalization of trade in goods. As such, it 
is of clear relevance in the governance of all nanotechnology products, in so far as domestic 
regulatory frameworks on NMs impact on trade. However, some scholars have questioned 
whether the WTO is the most appropriate venue for international coordination of 
nanotechnology regulation,39 reflecting a similarly restrained role of the WTO regarding 
biotechnology products. 
 
The WTO requires non-discrimination in matters of trade between countries, particularly, 
between imported and domestically produced ‘like’ products.40 However, Article XX 
GATT permits exemptions for national measures that are necessary to protect human 
health, animals and plants or relate to conservation of exhaustible natural resources, 
provided they do not entail ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination’ between countries or 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.41 Moreover, the State has to 
justify the measure as ‘necessary’, meaning that it would have to be the least trade 
restrictive measure reasonably available to achieve an environmental objective. The 
burden falls on the country imposing a trade measure to justify the exemptions. Some will 
argue that a product that contains NMs is ‘like’ the equivalent product without NMs and 
therefore should be subject to similar standards and should not be subject to trade-
                                                
34 Rotterdam Convention, n. 26 above, Article 1. 
35 Ibid., Articles 10 and 11. 
36 Ibid., Articles 7-10. 
37 The Convention requires each party to notify the Secretariat when taking a domestic regulatory 
action to ban or severely restrict a chemical Ibid., Article 10.2. 
38 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994; in force 1 January 1995) 
(‘GATT’). In addition, two key WTO agreements dealing with standards are relevant in the context of 
trade in NMs: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) (often cited in relation to biotechnology 
matters).Their implications on the development of regulations on nanotechnologies have been reviewed 
elsewhere. See D.M. Bowman and G.A. Hodge, n. 18 above. 
39 See E. Fisher, J. Jones and R. van Schomberg, n. 10 above. 
40 GATT, n. 38 above, Article III.4. 
41 Ibid., Article XX. 
 restrictive measures by the importing State. Others will claim that NMs could harm health 
or the environment and that NM products and normal products therefore are not ‘like’. 42 
NMs are often derived from common substances that are not new, and many industry 
stakeholders have taken the view that nanoparticles are no different from the bulk 
materials from which they are derived and therefore should be considered to be ‘like’ 
normal products. 43 However, NMs are of special interest precisely because they possess 
physical and chemical properties different from their parent compound. The fact that 
patents have been granted for numerous products containing NMs undermines the 
contention that engineered NMs should not be treated as new substances.44 
 
Several arguments have been raised for further harmonization of international 
standards relating to nanotechnologies. First, some suggest that harmonization would 
facilitate international trade, avoiding the disputes and inefficiencies experienced as a 
result of, for example, the inconsistent US and EU interpretations of the precautionary 
principle.45 Second, internationally consistent standards could avoid a ‘race to the 
bottom’ and could constrain national regulators from yielding to protectionist or 
alarmist demands with the view of shielding domestic producers from foreign 
competition.46 Third, international regulatory coordination would act to regulate the 
release of engineered NMs into the environment in one country and control their 
cross-border movement, thereby addressing the potentially adverse effects that their 
release would have on other States or areas beyond national jurisdiction.47 
 
Despite these potentially positive outcomes, the extent to which States may be willing 
to cooperate on the harmonization of nanotechnology standards and to improve the 
safety of trade in NM products should be balanced against the interests of advancing 
trade and technological innovation, development and dissemination. The following 
sections suggest that there are further disparities in national and regional regulatory 
regimes for nanotechnologies, which are likely to hinder any further attempts at 
international cooperation. 
 
EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL REGULATORY STANDARDS 
 
While the commercialization of nanotechnology is underway, the market entry of 
NMs has to date been relatively unconstrained due to a distinct absence of nano-specific 
regulatory frameworks. A significant regulatory loophole exists in the guise of 
chemicals regulations. Much of the recently adopted chemical regulatory frameworks in 
the EU, UK, Australia and the US are primarily focused on ‘new chemicals’. However, at 
                                                
42 For example, in the first Tuna-Dolphin case (1991), which involved the US ban on Mexican exports 
of tuna which were caught applying ‘unsustainable’ fishing techniques, the Panel established that the 
US could only rely on properties of the ‘product’ not on the ‘process’ of production. GATT Panel 3 
September 1991, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39S/155. Beyond the 
question of discrimination between ‘like products’, the WTO dispute settlement bodies may assess the 
environmental grounds under Article XX to establish the validity of the measure. 
43 R. Weiss, ‘For Science, Nanotech Poses Big Unknowns’, Washington Post (1 February 2004). 
44 S. Vaidhyanathan, ‘Nanotechnologies and the Law of Patents: A Collision Course’, in: G. Hunt and 
M.D. Mehta (eds.), Nanotechnology: Risk, Ethics and Law (Earthscan, 2006), 225. 
45 M. Mansour and S. Key, ‘From Farm to Fork: The Impact on Global Commerce of the New 
European Union Biotechnology Regulatory Scheme’, 38:1 The International Lawyer (2004), 55. 
46 K.W. Abbott, D.S. Sylvester and G.E. Marchant, ‘Transnational Regulation of Nanotechnology: 
Reality or Romanticism?’,in: G.A. Hodge, D.M. Bowman and A.D. Maynard (eds.), International 
Handbook on Regulating Nanotechnologies (Edward Elgar, 2009), 525. 
47 Ibid. 
 present existing chemicals produced at nanoscale are not considered to be ‘new’. For example, 
nanoscale versions of titanium dioxide, already in widespread use in sunscreen products, are 
treated the same way as the equivalent bulk material even if they have different properties.48 
The failure of each country to address this gap raises some concern because, while 
commercialization of products containing manufactured nanoparticles continues to escalate, 
work to understand the human and environmental impacts is lagging behind. Consequently, 
our review of national and EU regulatory efforts to develop a sound governance structure 
suggests that they remain fundamentally weak in all four jurisdictions. A cursory 
examination of these jurisdictions shows that none of them have enacted nano-specific 
regulations, although there have been recent proposals for reform. 
 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Within the EU, there are two main types of environmental legislation relating to 
chemicals: (i) environmental legislation concerning the protection of air, water and 
soil quality from pollution; and (ii) specific regulations concerning the manufacturing 
and commercialization of chemical substances. The latter can: prohibit or restrict the 
use of certain substances; limit the use of utilities (water, air and energy); impose 
controls over the production process by creating emission standards, efficiency goals or 
impose the adoption of the latest ‘end of pipe’ technology; or impose controls on the 
final product, that is, introduce notification requirements for the use and 
commercialization of new substances. 
 
There are currently no specific regulations for nanotechnologies or NMs in the EU, but 
the manufacturers’ use and disposal of NMs are at least in principle covered by a 
complex set of existing regulatory regimes. In addition to the 2006 Regulation on 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH),49 
further discussed below, these include the Industrial Emissions Directive50 and other 
consumer and environmental protection regimes. Particular product types are covered 
by a series of vertical legislation which include: product or sector-specific regulations 
for pharmaceuticals,51 veterinary medicines,52 pesticides53 and biocides.54 Specific 
legislation for toys,55 cosmetics56 and ‘end of life’ products, such as the Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive, are also of relevance.57 
                                                
48 See RCEP, n. 8 above. 
49 Regulation 1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation 
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), [2006], OJ L396/267. 
50  Directive 2010/75/EU of 24 November 2010 on Industrial Emissions (Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control) (Recast), [2010] OJ, L334/17. 
51 See, e.g., Directive 2011/62/EU of 8 June 2011 Amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, as Regards the Prevention of the Entry into the 
Legal Supply Chain of Falsified Medicinal Products, [2011] OJ L174/74. 
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Until 1 June 2008, new chemicals in the EU were covered by regulations on the 
notification of new substances. This system has been superseded by the REACH 
Regulation. REACH constitutes the EU framework legislation for the management, 
control and use of chemicals, replacing several directives and simplifying the previous 
patchwork of over 40 separate pieces of legislation. REACH aims to ensure a high level 
of protection of human health and the environment, including the promotion of 
alternative methods for assessment of hazards of substances, as well as the free 
circulation of substances on the internal market and enhancing competitiveness and 
innovation.58 REACH also created the European Chemicals Agency, which carries out 
several scientific, technical and administrative and management functions to implement 
REACH throughout the EU. 
 
The effect of the REACH Regulation is to impose responsibility on those who 
manufacture and sell the products for the potential threats to human health and 
environment. It creates an obligation for these actors to minimize the risk of adverse 
effects.59 However, given the speed of developments in the field of nanotechnology, 
there will likely be a gap between innovation and knowledge of possible ‘new’ 
hazards, making it difficult to resolve issues of safety of new materials using 
traditional risk-based regulatory frameworks. 
 
REACH ended the different treatment of ‘new’ and ‘existing’ substances under EU law. 
However, the Regulation still distinguishes between non-phase-in (new) and phase-in 
(existing) substances for purposes of registration time frames and in some cases data 
requirements.60 Eventually, all chemicals that fall within its scope will be subject to 
registration requirements and data sets will need to be prepared. This compilation of 
data will be useful in tracking and assessing the potential risks associated with 
nanotechnologies. 61  However, whether such data will be comprehensive enough 
remains to be seen. A 2009 Resolution by the European Parliament called for an 
inventory of nanomaterials on the market to address the fact that such information is 
not yet available otherwise.62  According to a Communication by the European 
Commission, as of February 2012 seven substance registrations and 18 CLP 
notifications had selected ‘nanomaterial’ as the form of the substance, while a further 
assessment identified additional substances with nanoforms.63  
 
REACH also transfers responsibility of carrying out risk assessments from the Member 
States to the producers and importers of a chemical substance.64 This risk assessment will 
                                                                                                                                      
[2003] OJ L37/24. 
58 Regulation 1907/2006, n. 61 above, Article 1.1. The registration of substances and articles under 
REACH is being phased in over an 11-year period (2007-2018), with chemicals manufactured or imported 
in large volumes and certain ‘substances of very high concern’ (i.e., with particular hazardous properties) 
being registered first, followed by those manufactured or imported in smaller volumes. 
59 Ibid., Article 1.3. 
60 Ibid., preamble 20 and Article 60.2. 
61 Ibid., Annex II. 
62  European Parliament Resolution of 24 April 2009 on Regulatory Aspects of Nanomaterials 
(2008/2208(INI)), found at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2009-
328>. 
63  Communication from the European Commission on the Second Regulatory Review on 
Nanomaterials, COM(2012) 572. 
64 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
 be ‘use specific’. In other words, each downstream user is required to declare how it 
uses the chemical substance, and the manufacturer is required to produce a risk 
assessment document with specific instructions for each use situation. 65  The 
Regulation also requires information about risks associated with chemicals to be 
outlined for users in ‘safety data sheets’.66 Chemicals that pose a serious hazard may be 
banned or restricted (i.e. they may be used only following the grant of a specific 
‘authorisation’). 67 REACH only applies to substances as well as substances in articles 
that are produced or imported in an amount of over one tonne per year. 
 
The European Commission’s action plan on nanosciences and nanotechnologies, 
published in June 2005,68 recognizes the Commission’s role in promoting investment 
and innovation in NMs, as well as in setting standards for improvement of public health 
and environmental safety and international cooperation between the EU Member States in 
the context of NMs. The Action Plan specified that all applications and use of 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies must comply with the high level of public health, 
safety, consumer and worker protection and environmental protection chosen by the 
Union. To this end, the Commission’s Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly 
Identified Health Risks issued an opinion on the appropriateness of existing 
methodologies to assess the potential risks associated with engineered NMs and 
products of nanotechnologies.69 The European Commission subsequently published a 
Communication in 2008,70 which concluded that current legislation to a large extent 
covers risks in relation to NMs, and that risks can be dealt with under the current 
legislative framework. However, the Commission also noted that ‘current legislation may 
have to be modified in the light of new information becoming available, for example as 
regards thresholds used in some legislation’.71 The Commission’s conclusions have been 
challenged by a non-binding resolution adopted in April 2009 by the European 
Parliament, following a detailed report on NMs presented by the European 
Parliament’s Environment Committee.72 The resolution asks for tighter controls on 
nanotechnologies, in particular with respect to legislation on chemicals, food, waste, 
air, water and workers’ protection. 
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In response, the Commission has been reviewing all relevant legislation with a view to 
proposing regulatory changes wherever necessary and to developing nano-specific 
instruments for the implementation of regulation. One example is the recent recast of 
the EU Cosmetic Regulation73 which has taken the position of the Parliament into 
consideration, and already includes specific provisions for NMs (including a 
definition, requirements for notification, labelling provisions, specific guidelines for 
safety assessment and reporting of NMs).74 
 
In October 2012 the Commission published its Second Regulatory Review on 
Nanomaterials. 75  The review highlighted the role of nanotechnology as a ‘key 
enabling technology’, providing the basis for innovation and growth and a key to 
solving major societal challenges. It recognizes the need to balance the protection of 
health and the environment with promoting competitiveness and capturing the 
benefits of nanotechnology, and stresses the need for international cooperation and 
responsible development. The review confirms that the REACH remains the best 
possible framework for the risk management of NMs and chemicals that are not the 
subject of more specific legislation, but that further detailed guidance is needed to 
clarify how NMs should be identified and addressed in the registration process. In 
particular, it is still unclear whether NMs should be registered as forms of, or distinct 
from, their corresponding bulk substance. The Commission has established a Working 
Group to explore the relevant technical and scientific issues and develop best 
practices.76 
 
Similar findings were presented by the Commission in its 2012 REACH review, which concludes 
that the existing legal framework was sufficient to address nanotechnologies, but suggests that 
future reviews are likely to be forthcoming.77 In particular, the Commission suggests that it 
will launch an impact assessment of relevant regulatory options, including possible 
amendments of REACH Annexes, to ensure further clarity on how nanomaterials are 
addressed and safety demonstrated in registration dossiers. If appropriate, the 
Commission suggests that it will come forward with a draft implementing act by 
December 2013.78 
 
The limitations of REACH in addressing nanomaterials are considerable. The 
classification of nanoscale materials as ‘existing substances’ – i.e., substances listed 
in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances and placed 
on the market before September 1981 – is a recurrent regulatory gap.79 This arises if it 
is considered that the chemical structure of the nanoscale form is no different from its 
bulk equivalent. The concern here is that the nanoscale substance may pass through its 
life cycle without additional scrutiny of its unique properties, possibly leading to a 
situation in which measures cannot be taken to reduce potential risks.  
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There are other areas of uncertainty regarding the scope of REACH in respect of 
NMs. Crucially, there are no specific provisions for NMs in REACH. The 
abovementioned annual production/importation thresholds, which potentially prevent 
the registration of NMs manufactured, used or imported in quantities of less than one 
tonne, is also an area of uncertainty. However, the European Commission has provided 
some clarification.80 First, it has suggested that REACH requirements apply to NMs, 
even though there are no nano-specific provisions. Second, when an existing chemical 
substance is introduced on the market at the nanoscale, the registration dossier will have 
to be updated to include specific properties of the nanoform of the substance. Third, 
the additional information, including different classification and labelling of the 
nanoform and additional risk management measures, will need to be included in the 
registration dossier. Although these guidelines have not amended REACH itself, they 
provide an important interpretative tool of the legislation and enhance clarity and 
certainty for the regulated industries. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The UK is one of the EU Member States that has taken a leading role in generating the 
discussion on nano-regulation. In the majority of cases, UK law generally implements 
measures that have been agreed and harmonized at the EU level. Therefore, the UK and 
other Member States need to address any regulatory shortfalls through the European 
Commission. Although there is evidence 81  suggesting that present regulatory 
frameworks at the EU and UK level are sufficiently broad and flexible to govern 
nanotechnologies at the current stage of their development, some regulations may 
need to be modified on a precautionary basis. 
 
Reviews of the UK regulatory framework have identified regulatory gaps due to: (i) 
legislative thresholds and definitions designed primarily to address risks associated 
with bulk chemicals; (ii) exemptions for products based on their size (i.e. on a 
tonnage basis); and (c) uncertainties over: current scientific knowledge and 
understanding of hazards and risks from exposure to NMs, including potential impacts 
of NMs on human and environmental health; agreed dose units that can be used in 
hazard and exposure assessments; and reliable and validated methods for 
measurement and characterization that can be used in monitoring potential exposure 
to NMs.82 
 
To address these regulatory gaps, a report by the Royal Society and Royal Academy 
of Engineering recommended that all relevant regulatory bodies consider whether 
existing regulations are appropriate to protect humans and reduce the environmental 
hazards outlined in the report, and publish their review and details of how they will 
address any regulatory gaps.83 The report also indicates that establishment of a 
regulation requires assessments of the hazards and the likelihood or duration of 
exposure, these factors combining to produce the risk to any exposed biological or 
human population. The overall aim is to determine the risk management measures 
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 needed to eliminate the risks or (in practice) reduce them to acceptable levels. This 
process of evidence gathering needs to be informed by factual evidence, usually 
obtained from toxicological, environmental or epidemiological studies. 
 
The UK government supported the recommendation by the Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering that nanomaterials be considered ‘new chemicals’ under 
existing UK and EU chemicals regulations.84 Moreover, in their response, the UK 
government noted that ‘in order to ensure that the products of nanotechnologies are 
properly regulated, the Government considers it likely that sector specific regulations, 
in addition to REACH, may be required’.85 The UK government further contends that 
‘to reduce the threshold dramatically to take account of potential issues arising from 
nanotechnologies would result in a large number of chemicals (in addition to the 
products of nanotechnologies) that are not currently being produced on an industrial 
scale, being subject to regulations designed for industrial products’.86 It thus plans to 
call for regulation of NMs at the European level whilst continuing to use REACH and 
keeping the regulatory situation under review as more evidence and information 
becomes available. 
 
UNITED STATES  
 
In the United States, regulators maintain that the unique size and properties of nanoscale 
materials do not warrant new regulation.87 At present the 1976 Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA)88 is the principal statute that provides authority to regulate 
chemicals and, therefore, has been the primary vehicle used by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate nanomaterials. In contrast to other environmental 
laws in the United States, which govern only the release into the environment, the 
TSCA grants EPA the broad authority to regulate the entire life cycle of a chemical 
substance. The EPA has regulatory authority in three key areas: (i) regulating 
chemicals that present health or environmental risks; (ii) screening new chemicals and 
significant new uses of existing chemicals; and (iii) testing chemicals where risks are 
unknown. However, the legislation does not specifically address NMs. 
 
It has been argued89 that the TSCA and other legislation are inadequate for regulating 
nanoproducts, and that they have serious shortcomings related to their legal authority, 
a lack of resources, or both.90 These shortcomings relate to the TSCA’s low volume 
exemptions and the implicit assumption that no information on risk of a chemical 
means that there is no risk. 
 
First, the TCSA contains volume exemptions for new chemicals or significant new 
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 uses of chemicals produced in volumes of 10,000 kg or less per year, although this 
threshold does not apply if the EPA determines that a chemical may have serious 
environmental effects. This threshold would exclude most NMs. 
 
Second, substances whose effects are uncertain are treated the same as substances that 
demonstrably pose no unreasonable risk. This presents a particularly difficult 
challenge to the regulation of nanotechnology given the vast uncertainty regarding its 
impact on health and safety. The EPA has to date not issued rules or guidance as to 
which nanoscale materials are ‘new chemical substances’ or ‘significant new uses’ such 
that they could be subject to TSCA notification requirements. It also has not yet changed 
the regulatory exemption for new chemicals produced in low volumes.91 However, in 
2012, the agency issued a series of actions to ensure the notification and 
registration of NMs. In particular, it adopted rules requiring companies to provide 
notifications of new use of existing chemicals on the basis of specific use and types 
of NMs (mainly carbon nanotubes, titanium- and silica-based compounds).92 The 
EPA plans to adopt such procedures for any new NMs before they are put on the 
market.93 
 
It can be noted that a basic difference between the US and the EU approach is that 
under the TSCA the burden of proof regarding the safety of a substance is on the 
regulatory authority (and not the manufacturer as under the REACH Regulation). 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia is also considering regulatory reforms. The Australian government has 
commissioned a review of its regulatory structure with respect to emerging risks related 
to nanotechnologies. The review found that Australia’s regulatory frameworks are 
‘generally well suited to allowing adequate management and control of risk posed by 
engineered NM and products incorporating NM and their manufacture, use and 
handling’.94 The review also outlined a few potential gaps, including whether NMs 
would be considered as new or existing substances and whether weight and volume 
thresholds are applicable. Australia has also developed a strategy for the regulation of 
NMs, supported by an in-depth stakeholder consultation, which concluded in 2010.95 
Since January 2011, Australia has implemented guidance for the notification of new 
NMs, making pre-market notification and the submission of safety information 
mandatory before new NMs can be placed on the market. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION 
 
Generally, risk regulation ensures that scientific uncertainty does not hamper decision 
making and seeks to eliminate or reduce the possibility of harm. In the context of 
nanotechnology, the policy goal should be optimal precaution against risks, that is, the 
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 point at which the marginal benefits of intervention are equal to its marginal costs.96For 
example, if the exposure to certain NMs in the workplace is known to cause serious 
harm to health and that harm could be eliminated at acceptable cost to society, 
protective measures ought to be put in place. However, costs alone should not determine 
the course of action. As discussed above, the precautionary principle comes into play 
when there is a lack of full scientific certainty about the threat of harm from a 
substance. On this basis, assumptions are made about the potential hazard, followed 
by as assessment of the risk of exposure, for example in the workplace or to the 
general public from use of products. For those substances that pose the most serious 
risk, regulatory measures are necessary to prevent harm to people or the environment. 
Identifying appropriate responses to uncertain risks is a difficult task for policy 
makers, as they are faced with a high degree of scientific uncertainty and the need to 
balance the costs and benefits of regulation as well as seeking a reasonable compromise 
between scientific freedom, technological innovation, consumer safety and 
environmental protection. Given that ‘free’ NMs present a more immediate risk of 
exposure compared to ‘fixed’ NMs embedded in composite materials, the proposed 
regulatory options should reflect this distinction by regulating products containing free 
NMs more closely. There are a number of possibilities for regulation, including: 
workplace controls; classification and labelling measures; control of emissions to air, 
water and land; waste disposal restrictions; marketing and use restrictions; and 
prohibition. 
 
Though at present considerable uncertainties make it difficult to carry out a cost-
benefit appraisal of the different regulatory interventions, this section discusses four 
key regulatory options to aid the future development of a governance framework for 
NMs: (i) maintain existing regulations; (ii) introduce a system of ‘grandfathering’ in 
which new regulations apply to new market entrants only; (iii) develop nano-specific 
and process-based regulations; and (iv) develop nano-specific and product-based 
regulations. 
 
MAINTAINING EXISTING REGULATIONS 
 
Maintaining existing regulations is synonymous with retaining the status quo. There are 
advantages of using existing regulations to manage the risks posed by nanotechnologies 
in that there are already systems in place to ensure enforcement and compliance. 
Another benefit is low operational costs due to the fact that frameworks are already 
established. Moreover, there are no costs associated with the introduction and 
administration of new regulations. This helps to explain why in the EU both industries 
and governments are in favour of using REACH and other existing regulations to 
govern NMs.97 
 
Given the regulatory gaps identified above, using existing regimes could be particularly 
costly where a plausible risk of harm exists. For example, if we apply the distinction 
between free and fixed/embedded NMs, free NMs are more hazardous than fixed NMs. In 
cases where free NMs are used in workplaces (in aerosol form), there is cause for concern 
if they are inhaled or absorbed through the skin as in cosmetic products. It follows that 
the type of NMs and their application are key determinants of the potential harm. 
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 Therefore, where there is direct exposure for current uses and applications of NMs – e.g. 
worker exposure or exposure through food applications – a precautionary approach 
should be invoked. 
 
The costs of potential liabilities to industry and the costs of recovering environmental 
damage98 are likely to outweigh the costs of improving safety under the existing regulations. 
Indeed, as nanotechnology enterprises grow, issues of civil liability (as well as 
criminal liability 99 ) will become increasingly relevant. As the commercial 
applications of nanotechnology increase, so will the relevance of civil liability for 
defective products, and any damage caused by the release of nanoparticles into the 
environment. 100  Moreover, Hunt points out that legal claims arising out of 
nanotechnology may be generated by personal injury claims, whether arising directly 
out of, for example, nanomedical applications, or possibly caused by the toxicity of 
nanoproducts, for example, nanoparticles in the environment. 101  In this regard, 
parallels can be drawn to the experiences with asbestos-related claims in the United 
States.102 
 
Governments in leading industrialized countries are currently relying on existing 
regulatory frameworks for environmental, health and safety regulation to cover 
nanotechnology risks and generally suggesting that any risks posed by NMs can be 
addressed using existing frameworks, although proposing minor adjustments to 
specific regulations. This is in line with the European Commission studies on 
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 nanotechnologies,103 discussed above, which concluded that current legislation to a large 
extent covers risks related to NMs.  
 
Although the ‘status quo’ option appears to be the option preferred by regulators and 
industry alike, other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations, argue that 
the failure to address the current loopholes in nanotechnology regulation goes against 
the precautionary principle, and potentially heightens the risks to the environment and 
human health posed by certain types of nanotechnologies.104 
 
A ‘GRANDFATHERING’ SYSTEM: NEW REGULATIONS FOR NEW 
MARKET ENTRANTS ONLY 
 
Instead of revamping the current system in its entirety, there is a middle ground 
option of introducing a system of ‘grandfathering’, in which existing firms can continue to 
operate under existing laws, while new legal provisions only apply to new market 
entrants. A key drawback of this approach is that it may encourage firms to take 
advantage of their ‘grandfathered’ status by increasing the production and use of NMs, 
which they can do at a lower cost than new entrants who are subject to more stringent 
legal standards. This approach could act as a disincentive for new firms wishing to 
engage in nanotechnology; thus reducing the number of nanomanufacturers and 
suppliers and, consequently, consumer choice.105 Decision makers need to consider 
these challenges in collaboration with industry. This collaboration between 
governments and industry is needed to reassure the public that the technology and its 
products are safe. A ‘grandfathering’ system, which segregates new and existing 
market participants and favours one over the other, is less likely to lead to 
collaborative outcomes. 
 
NANO-SPECIFIC AND PROCESS-BASED REGULATION 
 
A key feature of a process-based regime is the belief that the process of 
nanotechnology itself is a potential hazard, which presents unique risks that must be 
regulated. The underlying assumption is that the risk lies in the technique of 
nanotechnology, not its specific applications. This contrasts with a product-based 
approach, which addresses questions of regulation on a product-by-product basis. 
Measures adopted under such a regulatory framework seek to regulate the different uses 
of nanotechnologies in a uniform manner. This approach has been adopted in the 
regulation of GMOs in a number of jurisdictions, including the EU.106 However, 
application of a process-based approach to nanotechnologies is complicated by the fact 
that nanotechnologies have a wide remit of application and encompass various stages of 
technological development. 
 
Process-based regulation can be applied horizontally across different industrial and 
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 commercial sectors as well as vertically to products at different stages of their life cycle. 
The benefits of this approach are the significant reduction in risks and improved regulatory 
clarity; it thus arguably provides the best application of the precautionary principle. 
However, this approach has high administrative and compliance costs due to the 
introduction of new rules and requirements at the very early stages of nanotechnology 
development.107 Another major drawback relates to the fast pace of development for 
nanotechnologies. Combined with a lack of common nomenclature, this means that an 
overarching regime would require frequent revisions of the regulations to deal with 
applications not envisaged at the time of drafting.108 
 
NANO-SPECIFC AND PRODUCT-BASED REGULATION 
 
A key feature of a nano-specific, product-based approach is that it recognizes that 
risks posed by NMs can vary and that these risks need to be addressed on a case-by-
case basis. In contrast to process-based regulations that treat nanotechnology as a single 
entity, a product-based or substance-based approach to regulation addresses risks 
posed by particular uses of NMs in specific products, in specific sectors, and/or at 
specific stages in their life cycle. In other words, this approach allows regulatory 
measures to be introduced on an incremental basis targeting certain risks (and firms) 
when necessary. Some authors have called this approach ‘differentiated’ to denote it 
may be realized through the adoption of new legislation and the introduction of policy 
to supplement existing legislative measures.109 
 
Proponents of this approach have highlighted that this is particularly relevant in the 
harmonized areas of EU law, such as food or chemicals regulation, where it is possible to 
adopt nano- and product-specific legislation.110 Options for nano-specific regulation 
include product licensing, labelling schemes and notification requirements. These are 
discussed in turn below. 
 
Product licensing 
 
Command and control regulation tends to specify the required or prohibited conduct, 
and includes prohibitions or limitations on discharge of certain pollutants or waste, 
mandating the adoption of certain technologies or the setting of specific standards.111 
Command-and-control regulatory measures that can be employed in the context of 
nanotechnologies include interventionist measures such as restricting the market entry of 
nanoproducts through product-specific licensing. 
 
A licensing regime could prohibit the manufacture or supply of certain products 
containing NMs unless minimum quality or safety conditions are met and authorization 
has been obtained. However, high costs are associated with the requirement for firms to 
acquire a licence prior to market entry as well as subsequent monitoring and 
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 enforcement.112 The high costs to industry to comply with licensing conditions could also 
prevent smaller start-up companies from using nanotechnologies, thus inhibiting the 
placing of NMs on the market. The benefit of such an interventionist product-specific 
regulation is that high costs could be justified by increased public confidence in the 
safety of high-risk products due to ex ante scrutiny.113 
 
Regulatory market-based incentives 
 
Other authors 114  have proposed less interventionist, market-based measures for 
regulating NMs that are more palatable to the regulated community and therefore 
would be more easily justified. Market-based legal instruments aim to establish a 
price for environmental goods that reflects the true costs of pollution and natural 
resources use, and include tradable permits, taxation schemes and labelling 
schemes.115 
 
A labelling requirement for NMs would enable consumers to decide whether to 
purchase conventional products whose risks are better known, or products containing 
NMs. The legislation requires that certain nanoproducts are labelled with warnings or 
instructions for use. In this vein, some authors have suggested that all products 
containing NMs should be subject to mandatory labelling requirements.116 Examples 
in regulation already exist. the EU Food Information to Consumers Regulation,117 for 
example, was approved by the Commission in July 2011 and will come into force in 
December 2014. It  requires labelling of ingredients in the form of nanomaterials 
(material plus word ‘nano’ in brackets), and similar reforms were introduced in the 
context of the EU Biocides Regulation, which concerns the placing on the market and 
the use of biocidal products for non-agricultural uses.118 
 
Mandating public disclosure of the presence of NMs in products would be in the long 
term interests of the nanotechnology industry, as it could help build the necessary 
public trust that the biotechnology industry never established when GMOs became 
available on the market. Eco-labelling and the provision of environmental 
information has been positively correlated with product and process innovations; 
more so than the introduction of environmental management systems.119  Some 
commentators120 have highlighted that product labelling systems that address health and 
environmental concerns are becoming a more widespread phenomenon in consumer 
societies worldwide, They argue that if European product-labelling legislation is to 
harness the considerable potential of consumer markets to advance environmental 
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 policy, then there needs to be a balance between international trade law and consumer 
opinion, which drove the traceability and labelling requirements in the EU.121 
 
However, this approach also has some drawbacks. Labelling requirements impose 
financial and regulatory burdens in terms of administrative costs, although these costs 
are generally lower than the mandatory controls typical of command and control 
regulations.122 Concerns have been raised regarding the effectiveness of labelling; 
warnings may not be noticeable and may convey little information.123 Furthermore, 
the environmental impact of labelling often depends on the scope and type of 
environmental information provided to consumers, and whether this environmental 
information will influence consumer or supplier behaviour. Most eco-labelling 
schemes have also received considerable industry opposition as there are costs 
associated with national broad-based schemes.124 Finally, potential conflicts with 
WTO law may emerge as the labelling scheme may be used as a protectionist 
measure.125 
 
Notification and monitoring requirements 
 
Notification requirements are a common feature in international environmental 
agreements. Under the ‘no-harm rule’, States have a general duty under customary 
international law to notify and consult with other affected States before the start of an 
activity with transboundary implications,126 particularly when activities within one 
State’s territory can cause environmental damage in another State or in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.127  
 
Within the confines of national law, a nano-specific notification scheme serves a similar 
function as labelling or information disclosure. Under a notification scheme, manufacturers 
or suppliers of NMs are required to submit information relating to their toxicity to a 
regulatory authority prior to manufacture or supply. Submission of data by 
manufacturers is a key element of REACH because it shifts the burden of proof 
regarding the safety of a substance from the regulator to the manufacturers, importers 
and producers. However, in light of the limitations of REACH in dealing with risks posed 
by NM, a nano-specific notification procedure would be more appropriate.128 Notification 
requirements are also at the heart of EU GMO legislation.129 
 
These ‘notification of new substances’ requirements are also present in other countries, 
such as Japan, although the classification in this country is made before the substance 
                                                
121 Ibid. 
122  W.F. Pedersen, Regulating Nanotechnology by Information Disclosure (Environmental Law 
Institute, 2005), found at: <http://www.eli.org/pdf/research/nanotech/presentations/pedersen.pdf>. 
123 See A.C. Lin, n. 87 above. 
124 N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky and D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 2004); H. Wright and R. Pereira, ‘A Legal Framework for Clean Technology 
Transfer and Finance’, in: K. Makuch and R. Pereira, n. 111 above, 75. 
125 See, e.g., WTO AB 16 May 2012, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R. 
126 See, e.g., Pulp Mills, n. 11 above. 
127 The no harm-rule is elaborated, for instance, in the Rio Declaration, n. 9 above, Principle 2.  
128 See E. Stokes, n. 96 above. 
129 See Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified 
Organisms, [2001] OJ L106/1, Article 13.1; Annex II. 
 can be manufactured. Mandatory base data sets are required under both EU and 
Japanese law, leading to some kind of classification. The US TSCA, by contrast, does 
not require such a data set and does not lead to a classification. The TSCA requires the 
EPA to keep an inventory of all substances regulated under the Act and requires new 
substances to be notified to EPA before manufacture or importation. However, since 
the Act does not specify a base data set, it leaves EPA with the responsibility of 
demonstrating that a chemical may pose an unreasonable risk. 130  Australia, as 
mentioned above, has implemented guidance for the notification of NMs, making pre-
market notification and submission of safety information for new NMs mandatory. 
 
The advantage of a notification scheme is that it imposes lower financial and regulatory 
burdens on manufacturers, because much of the information sought is generated in the 
development of new products. However, a notification system is not effective without a 
standard system of nomenclature and measurement. Given the current diversity and 
complexity of NMs, current nomenclature may not be adequate to characterize them. 
Both accurate labelling and notification systems therefore rely on standardized, 
globalized nomenclature. 
 
In addition, existing regulatory provisions regarding chemicals and materials have started 
to include NMs in their listings and requirements to provide monitoring and control 
before and after their introduction to the market. There is a strong case that products 
containing free NMs should be subject to a screening process, as well as post-market 
monitoring and reporting requirements. In the UK government response131 to the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) report,132 the government agreed 
with the RCEP recommendations on environmental monitoring and the development 
of a simple checklist as part of an early warning system to facilitate better collaboration 
between industry, government and the scientific community. The details of the simple 
checklist should include information on manufacturers and importers, information on 
quantities produced and how they are used in wider industry.133 
 
Regulatory agencies in a number of countries are considering such specific notification 
requirements. For example, the US EPA has since 2009 been evaluating specific 
notification and registration procedures for NMs, in particular carbon nanotubes.134 A 
debate in the US Senate on the Safe Chemical Act that took place in 2010-2011 
included a proposal for reform of the TSCA that would introduce relevant changes to 
this statute and could lead to an approach similar to the one used under REACH 
regarding monitoring and notification requirements (with the burden of proof shifting 
to the producer), yet the bill is still to be adopted135 The proposals in the United States 
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 for NM monitoring following their market release are very much in line with EU 
GMO legislation, which requires that Member States take measures to ensure 
traceability at all stages of the placing on the market of GMOs.136 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
To date, nanotechnology is not regulated as a sector per se, as it represents an 
emerging family of heterogeneous technologies enabling manipulation of matter at 
the atomic level. Nanotechnology offers many potential benefits to society in areas as 
wide-ranging as consumer products, health care, chemicals, cosmetics and waste 
treatment. Still, as is the case with many new technologies, we currently have only a 
limited understanding of the potential risks of NMs, and some studies suggest certain 
NMs may have negative impacts on human health and the environment in case of 
exposure or release into the environment. However, information on toxicological 
impacts is still limited. It is precisely on account of this limitation of knowledge that 
the application of the precautionary principle makes sense. Furthermore, if policy 
makers and stakeholders recognize the full benefits of the technology’s potential, the 
development of a governance system for nanoscience and nanotechnologies that is both 
effective and proportional to potential risks is of utmost importance. 
 
There is an increasing recognition that nano-regulation is needed. In the past few years, 
the debate has focused on the first attempts to introduce adjustments for NMs to 
existing regulations, particularly in the EU. The most relevant example of this action is 
the recast of the Cosmetic Regulation in the EU.137  
 
The progress made towards regulation of NMs is varied: some authorities focus on 
amending existing instruments and adopting mandatory reporting schemes while 
others prefer the use of voluntary measures or a combination of both. Yet a cursory 
examination of existing regulations indicates that there are still significant regulatory 
gaps, and extensive amendments are required to address the risks posed by NMs. In 
response, regulatory agencies in the EU and a number of other countries are starting to 
apply or considering the introduction of nano-specific legislation, including legislation 
pertaining to notification, monitoring, labelling and licensing schemes. It is 
encouraging that, at present, European and national regulatory regimes are under 
review and could be subject to reforms.  
 
Due to the transboundary nature of NMs, international efforts to develop harmonized 
tools through bodies such as the OECD and WTO are critical. Successful efforts in 
international cooperation have sought to promote high levels of protection whilst 
enabling science and industries to operate freely in a global economic space. 
Difficulties have arisen due to differences in regulatory frameworks regulatory 
cultures and societal perceptions of risk, which have contributed to the divergence of 
regulatory responses across different jurisdictions. 
 
Therefore, the development of nanotechnology regulation should consider and 
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 identify technological risks whilst promoting international cooperation at the early 
stage of policy processes, and acknowledge the challenges in ascertaining adequate 
information both to allow evaluation of the safety of NM and the presence of products 
containing NM. 
 
In sum, different jurisdictions take different approaches to regulation. However, many 
factors will influence the extent to which these differences in approach result in 
disparate regulatory actions. These factors include resources for implementation, 
interpretations by regulatory authorities, subsequent reforms and, perhaps most 
importantly, the extent to which regulators coordinate and share information at this 
critical juncture in the regulation of NMs. 
 
Social, political and economic factors influence views on nanotechnology. There are 
proponents and opponents of nanotechnologies. Any regulatory approach needs to 
account for these opposing views. For now, we recommend that lawmakers, regulators 
and standard-setting bodies find the appropriate balance between soft and hard law 
standards, command and control regulations and market-based incentives. The 
resulting regulatory mix should at least include nano-specific standards (particularly 
notification and monitoring requirements). 138  Furthermore, we suggest that risk 
assessment, sound scientific approaches and application of the precautionary principle 
ought to provide the basis for the regulation of NMs. 
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